Conexão política, incentivos e gerenciamento de percepções no Brasil

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the influence of political connection, in the management of stakeholders' perceptions, in Brazilian public companies considered suspicious of managing (non)accounting results in order to reach and/or exceed the consensus of analysts, to report near zero profit or to maintain. previous period profit performance. Thus, this investigation analyzes the relationship of perception management - through pro forma earnings release, earnings management by accruals (GR) and earnings management by operational decision (GRR) - and political connection - via campaign (CDOA), governance structure (CGOV) and ownership structure (CPRO). The sample is composed of 301 Brazilian companies listed on the Stock Exchange, Brazil, Balcão (B3) between 2010 and 2017, as financial sector companies and regulated ones were excluded, totaling 2,373 observations. For the earnings management analysis, by means of pro forma results, adjusted EBTIDA reported values (EBAJU) were used. For the analysis of the earnings management by accruals, the updated Modified Jones model (DECHOW et al., 2012) was used. In turn, it was estimated the earnings management by operational decisions according to Roychowdhury model (2006), through abnormal production cost levels (GRR_PRO), abnormal discretionary expense levels (GRR_DIS) and abnormal level of cash flow from operations (GRR_FCO). The analysis involved grouping the data in an unbalanced panel and applying tests to identify the most appropriate regression models in the relationship between perception management and political connection. Considering the established assumptions, the results suggest that the political connection impacts the management of accounting results by accruals (H1a), operational decisions (H1b) and pro forma earnings release (H2). In addition, the findings predict that the hierarchy and preferences of choice of perception management are distinct in politically connected companies and in relation to other firms (H3). In general, the results indicate that in order to achieve analysts' profit forecasts connected companies use management through EBAJU, GRA and GRR. By contrast, there is evidence of using management by means of EBAJU to maintain prior earnings performance. Also, the findings indicate that connected company managers use EBAJU and GRR, in a complementary manner, to report near zero profits, possibly due to the costs related to each strategy. The results of the sensitivity analysis indicate, in summary, that: (i) the political connection has no influence on aggressive pro forma earnings release; (ii) the (dis)incentives for release of pro forma earnings are distinct in the connected companies and in the others; (iii) the effect of country governance reduces the effect of political connection on managing stakeholder perceptions; and (iv) Heckman regression results suggest that the analyzes do not show self-selection bias